Within Mythcraft
When Falsehoods Are Spread on Purpose
Deliberate deception may require platform, policy and institutional responses as well as individual fact-checking.
On this page
- Coordination and manipulation
- Platform and media system effects
- Responses beyond individual correction
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Introduction
Organised disinformation campaigns are not simply myths spreading by accident. They are deliberate attempts to make false or misleading claims look popular, local, spontaneous or trustworthy. That changes the response. Individual fact-checking still matters, but it is not enough when a network of fake accounts, covert media pages, paid influencers, hacked materials, automated amplification or deceptive advertising is being used to manipulate public attention. The public problem is not only “what is true?” but “who is trying to make this story dominate, and by what means?”
This is why organised disinformation sits at the governance end of myths and misconceptions. It requires responses from platforms, journalists, election bodies, public health agencies, schools, regulators and civil society, not just better scepticism from individual users. The aim is not to police every wrong opinion. It is to identify coordinated deception, reduce artificial amplification, protect access to reliable information, and preserve open debate without letting covert campaigns impersonate the public.
How coordinated falsehoods differ from ordinary misconception
A misconception can spread because people misunderstand a topic, repeat a memorable story, or trust a source that turns out to be wrong. Organised disinformation is different because deception is part of the design. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue describes coordinated inauthentic behaviour as online entities such as accounts, pages or groups working together towards a shared goal, sometimes influencing both public perception and platform algorithms. [Institute for Strategic Dialogue]isdglobal.orgInstitute for Strategic DialogueCoordinated Inauthentic BehaviourCoordinated inauthentic behaviour is when a set of online entities—indiv…
The key word is not always “fake”. Some campaigns mix fake accounts with real supporters, genuine grievances, recycled news, misleading framing and selective evidence. That mixture is harder to challenge than a simple fabricated claim, because the campaign can hide behind real debate. A network might amplify a rumour about election fraud, a vaccine, a minority group or a public emergency by using apparently independent voices that are actually connected.
Researchers use terms such as “coordinated inauthentic behaviour” because the manipulation often lies in the coordination and disguise, not only in the content. A message may be partly true, but the campaign around it may still be deceptive if it uses sockpuppet accounts, concealed state backing, bought pages, repeated copy-and-paste posting or artificial engagement to create a false impression of public consensus. [PMC]pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.govPMCCoordinated inauthentic behavior: An innovative manipulation…by M Murero · 2023 · Cited by 27 — Coordinated inauthentic behavior (C…
This matters for public response because a normal correction may answer the false claim while missing the operation. A good response asks three questions at once: is the claim accurate, how is it being amplified, and who benefits from the deception?
Coordination and manipulation
Organised campaigns usually work by exploiting the social signals people use to judge credibility. A post that appears to have many supporters, to come from a local community, or to be repeated by several independent sources feels more credible than an isolated claim. Coordinated campaigns manufacture those signals.
The Russian Internet Research Agency remains one of the clearest public examples. The US Senate Intelligence Committee said Russian operatives used social media in 2016 to spread disinformation and social division while masquerading as Americans, using ads, fabricated news, self-generated content and platform tools to interact with tens of millions of users. [Senate Select Committee on Intelligence]intelligence.senate.govSelect Committee on Intelligencesites-default-files-documents-report-volume2.pdfPetersburg-based. Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to conduct an information warfare…Read more…
The lesson from that case is not that every political argument online is foreign interference. It is that influence operations often embed themselves inside existing divisions. They do not need to invent every grievance; they can intensify disputes that are already present. Senate-commissioned research on the Internet Research Agency found that its activity extended across major platforms and used identity-focused communities, political pages and targeted narratives to shape discourse. [DigitalCommons]digitalcommons.unl.eduSource details in endnotes.
Common tactics include:
- Impersonation: accounts or pages posing as ordinary citizens, local activists, journalists, community groups or official bodies.
- Astroturfing: making a centrally organised campaign look like a spontaneous grassroots movement.
- Narrative laundering: pushing a claim through fringe sites, social accounts or influencers until it appears in more mainstream discussion.
- Cross-platform seeding: starting a rumour on one platform, then amplifying screenshots, clips or summaries elsewhere.
- Engagement manipulation: using coordinated likes, shares, comments or replies to make a claim look more popular than it is.
- Harassment and flooding: overwhelming journalists, officials or citizens so that correction becomes costly and slower than the lie.
Not every campaign is sophisticated. Some are crude networks of fake accounts. Others are professional operations involving public relations firms, partisan media, state-aligned outlets, paid influencers or opaque advertising. The governance challenge is that the public sees individual posts, while investigators often need network evidence: account creation patterns, shared administrators, repeated URLs, timing, behaviour across platforms and links to known operators.
Why platform and media systems change the stakes
Organised disinformation campaigns thrive when a media system rewards speed, outrage and repetition. Platforms do not usually create the original myth, but their ranking systems, advertising tools, recommendation feeds and engagement metrics can change how far it travels. A rumour that might once have stayed local can become a national story if it is pushed by coordinated accounts and then picked up by influencers, partisan pages or news outlets seeking attention.
The European Commission’s strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation reflects this systems view. Its commitments include demonetising disinformation, improving transparency for political and issue advertising, addressing manipulative behaviour, empowering users, supporting fact-checkers and improving researchers’ access to data. [European Commission]commission.europa.euSource details in endnotes.
The Digital Services Act takes the same problem further by imposing duties on very large online platforms and search engines to assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to their services. In practice, this shifts part of the conversation from individual takedowns to platform design: recommender systems, advertising policies, crisis procedures, access to data and transparency reporting. [Digital Strategy]digital-strategy.ec.europa.eucode practice disinformationcode practice disinformation
This does not mean platforms can or should remove every false statement. Over-removal can chill lawful speech, especially during fast-moving events when facts are uncertain. The harder question is whether platforms are allowing deceptive networks to game their systems. A governance response can focus on behaviour rather than viewpoint: fake account networks, undisclosed political advertising, coordinated manipulation, bot-like amplification, monetisation of harmful hoaxes and impersonation of trusted institutions.
Media organisations face a related risk. When journalists report that “a claim is going viral”, they may unintentionally reward a campaign’s strategy. Responsible coverage should avoid amplifying unverified claims simply because they are trending. It should identify uncertainty, explain the source of the claim, describe the amplification pattern when known, and avoid headline framing that repeats the falsehood without context.
The public response cannot be only “check before sharing”
“Check before sharing” is useful advice, but it places too much responsibility on individuals when the problem is organised at scale. A person scrolling through a feed cannot audit account networks, advertising libraries, bot clusters or covert foreign influence operations. Public resilience needs several layers.
First, institutions need rapid, credible communication. During elections, health emergencies or public disorder, silence creates a vacuum. Official bodies do not need to comment on every rumour, but they do need clear channels, fast correction of high-risk falsehoods and consistent updates when facts change. The World Health Organization describes infodemic management as a systematic approach that includes listening to community concerns, promoting understanding of expert advice, building resilience to misinformation and engaging communities to take positive action. [World Health Organization]who.intSource details in endnotes.
Second, communities need trusted intermediaries. Public health agencies, election commissions and police forces often struggle if they speak only from central accounts. Local journalists, community leaders, teachers, doctors, faith leaders and civil society groups may be better placed to recognise rumours early and respond in language that people trust. This is especially important where distrust of government or media is already high.
Third, people need prebunking, not only debunking. Prebunking teaches people to recognise manipulation techniques before they encounter a specific false claim. Research on psychological inoculation has found that exposing people to weakened examples of misleading tactics can improve resilience to misinformation. Large-scale experiments on social media have tested short videos explaining techniques such as emotional manipulation, scapegoating and false dichotomies. University of Bristol [Science.org]science.orgSource details in endnotes.
Fourth, platforms need to reduce artificial reach. Labelling a false post is not enough if the system continues to recommend, monetise or algorithmically boost the network spreading it. The more organised the campaign, the more important it becomes to address amplification, account authenticity, advertising transparency and repeat offenders.
Fifth, researchers and watchdogs need access to evidence. Without data access, the public debate becomes dependent on what platforms voluntarily disclose. The European Digital Media Observatory’s work on implementation of the EU Code of Practice has focused on transparency, media literacy, fact-checking partnerships and research access, while also highlighting the difficulty of assessing platform performance from incomplete reporting. [EDMO]edmo.euOpen source on edmo.eu.
The hardest balance: resisting manipulation without controlling debate
Public response to organised disinformation has to avoid two errors. The first is naivety: treating coordinated deception as if it were merely a collection of mistaken posts. The second is overreach: treating disputed or unpopular speech as disinformation simply because authorities dislike it.
This distinction is why definitions matter. Disinformation involves intent to mislead, but intent is difficult to prove from a single post. Campaign analysis therefore often relies on behavioural evidence: coordination, deception about identity, repeated patterns, hidden funding, artificial amplification or links to known operators. A false claim shared by an ordinary user should not be treated the same way as a covert network designed to impersonate ordinary users.
The UK debate shows the tension. The Online Safety Act 2023 introduced new duties for regulated services and created a false communications offence for knowingly false messages intended to cause non-trivial harm, but critics and parliamentary scrutiny have argued that the regime is not designed to tackle much viral misinformation as a systems problem. [GOV.UK]GOV.UKOnline Safety Act: explainerOnline Safety Act: explainer [UK Parliament Committees]committees.parliament.ukSource details in endnotes.
The EU approach is more explicitly systemic, especially for very large platforms. Even there, implementation is contested. The Code of Practice and Digital Services Act can require risk assessment, transparency and mitigation, but the effectiveness of those measures depends on enforcement, platform cooperation, independent audit, researcher access and whether commitments produce measurable changes rather than public relations language. [European Commission]commission.europa.euSource details in endnotes. [disinfo]disinfo.eucib detection tree third branchcib detection tree third branch A democratic response should therefore be precise. It should target covert manipulation, fraud, impersonation, illegal threats, foreign interference, undisclosed political advertising and artificial amplification. It should be cautious about broad state power to define truth in ordinary political debate. The aim is to protect the conditions for public reasoning, not to make institutions immune from criticism.
What effective response looks like in practice
A mature public response to organised disinformation treats the problem as an ecosystem issue. It connects fact-checking, platform integrity, public communication, journalism standards, civic education and legal safeguards.
One useful model is a layered response:
- Detection: researchers, platforms, journalists and civil society groups identify unusual coordination, suspicious amplification, impersonation or recurring narratives.
- Attribution with caution: investigators distinguish between confirmed operators, likely links and unknown actors, avoiding overconfident claims.
- Claim correction: fact-checkers and relevant experts explain what is false, what is known, what is uncertain and where reliable updates can be found.
- Distribution response: platforms reduce artificial amplification, remove fake-account networks, label manipulated media, restrict deceptive advertising or demonetise repeat offenders.
- Public guidance: authorities and trusted intermediaries explain what people should do, especially during elections, emergencies or safety incidents.
- Review and transparency: platforms and institutions publish enough data for independent assessment, while protecting privacy and legitimate security needs.
This approach recognises that different problems need different tools. A harmless old myth may need a patient explainer. A coordinated campaign impersonating election officials may require rapid platform action, public alerts and possibly law enforcement. A health rumour spreading through worried communities may require listening, local engagement and practical access to care, not only correction.
The public also has a role, but it is more realistic than asking everyone to become an investigator. People can pause before sharing emotionally charged claims, check whether a source is who it says it is, look for confirmation from reputable outlets or official channels, and be wary of accounts that push constant outrage across unrelated topics. But the burden cannot rest on individual vigilance alone.
Why this changes how myths and misconceptions should be understood
Organised disinformation campaigns show that some false beliefs persist not because people are foolish, but because attention can be engineered. Myths and misconceptions often survive through memory, identity and repetition; organised campaigns weaponise those same features. They turn uncertainty into opportunity, disagreement into vulnerability, and platform incentives into distribution machinery.
The most useful public response is therefore not a single tactic. Fact-checking helps, but it works best when paired with prebunking, transparent platform rules, independent research access, resilient local media, trusted public communication and proportionate regulation. The goal is not a perfectly clean information space. That is impossible, and attempts to create one can threaten free expression. The goal is a fairer information environment in which covert manipulation is harder, trustworthy information is easier to find, and citizens are not left alone against organised deception.
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Further Reading
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The Chaos Machine
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Active Measures
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Endnotes
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Source: pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Link: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC10060790/Source snippet
PMCCoordinated inauthentic behavior: An innovative manipulation...by M Murero · 2023 · Cited by 27 — Coordinated inauthentic behavior (C...
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Source: intelligence.senate.gov
Title: Select Committee on Intelligencesites-default-files-documents-report-volume2.pdf
Link: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-report-volume2.pdfSource snippet
Petersburg-based. Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to conduct an information warfare...Read more...
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Source: intelligence.senate.gov
Link: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/ -
Source: intelligence.senate.gov
Link: https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/12/17/press-new-reports-shed-light-internet-research-agency-e2-80-99s-social-media-tactics/ -
Source: who.int
Link: https://www.who.int/health-topics/infodemic -
Source: science.org
Link: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.abo6254 -
Source: edmo.eu
Link: https://edmo.eu/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/EDMO-Report-%E2%80%93-Implementing-the-EU-Code-of-Practice-on-Disinformation.pdf -
Source: edmo.eu
Link: https://edmo.eu/publications/implementing-the-eu-code-of-practice-on-disinformation-an-evaluation-of-vlopse-compliance-and-effectiveness-jan-jun-2024/ -
Source: GOV.UK
Title: Online Safety Act: explainer
Link: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/online-safety-act-explainer/online-safety-act-explainer -
Source: committees.parliament.uk
Link: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/135/science-innovation-and-technology-committee/news/208296/uks-online-safety-regime-unable-to-tackle-the-spread-of-misinformation-and-cannot-keep-users-safe-online-mps-warn/ -
Source: publications.parliament.uk
Link: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5901/ldselect/ldcomm/39/3910.htm -
Source: committees.parliament.uk
Link: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/106192/html/ -
Source: publications.parliament.uk
Link: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmcumeds/1791/1791.pdf -
Source: committees.parliament.uk
Link: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/128453/html/ -
Source: committees.parliament.uk
Link: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/111691/html/ -
Source: committees.parliament.uk
Link: https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/87743/pdf/ -
Source: disinfo.eu
Title: cib detection tree third branch
Link: https://www.disinfo.eu/publications/cib-detection-tree-third-branch/ -
Source: legislation.gov.uk
Link: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2023/50 -
Source: youtube.com
Title: Detecting and Responding to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior
Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K30Hw5jXF4ASource snippet
Disinformation and the digital public sphere...
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Title: Disinformation and the digital public sphere
Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2J2d76TfDkSource snippet
Why Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Matters...
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Source: isdglobal.org
Link: https://www.isdglobal.org/our-expertise/information-warfare-and-online-manipulation/coordinated-inauthentic-behaviour/Source snippet
Institute for Strategic DialogueCoordinated Inauthentic BehaviourCoordinated inauthentic behaviour is when a set of online entities—indiv...
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Source: digitalcommons.unl.edu
Link: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/senatedocs/2/ -
Source: commission.europa.eu
Link: https://commission.europa.eu/topics/countering-information-manipulation/strengthened-eu-code-practice-disinformation_en -
Source: digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu
Title: code practice disinformation
Link: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation -
Source: digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu
Link: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act -
Source: ec.europa.eu
Link: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_2348 -
Source: disinfocode.eu
Link: https://disinfocode.eu/reports/download/136 -
Source: disinfocode.eu
Link: https://disinfocode.eu/ -
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Additional References
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Source: arxiv.org
Link: https://arxiv.org/html/2410.22716v2 -
Source: oecd.org
Link: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2020/08/governance-responses-to-disinformation_6285c78a/d6237c85-en.pdf -
Source: youtube.com
Title: How disinformation campaigns manipulate public opinion
Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=713p0v0qTz0Source snippet
Detecting and Responding to Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior...
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Source: youtube.com
Title: The anatomy of an online disinformation campaign
Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s5R_9k2w42YSource snippet
How disinformation campaigns manipulate public opinion...
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Source: rand.org
Link: https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay.html -
Source: nass.org
Link: https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2021-08/white-paper-dominion-nass-summer21.pdf -
Source: eu-digital-services-act.com
Link: https://www.eu-digital-services-act.com/ -
Source: facebook.com
Link: https://www.facebook.com/unesco/posts/during-elections-social-media-platforms-are-a-source-of-information-but-also-a-s/572041711638048/ -
Source: futurefreespeech.org
Link: https://futurefreespeech.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Empowering-Audiences-Through-%E2%80%98Prebunking-Michael-Bang-Petersen-Background-Report_formatted.pdf -
Source: fullfact.org
Link: https://fullfact.org/policy/online-safety-act/
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