Within Mythcraft
Why Wrong Ideas Can Feel Coherent
Misconceptions can feel stable because they fit into a wider model of how the world works.
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- Models rather than isolated facts
- Why pressure brings old ideas back
- Teaching through model repair
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Introduction
Wrong ideas often feel coherent because they are not held as isolated facts. They sit inside a wider mental model: a working picture of how causes, people, systems or risks fit together. That model may be incomplete or mistaken, but it can still explain everyday experience, predict what “should” happen next, and make new information feel easy to sort. This is why simply replacing a myth with “false” rarely works. A correction that removes one piece of a person’s model can leave a gap, and the mind may keep using the old explanation because it still makes the story feel complete. Research on misinformation calls this the continued influence effect: retracted information can keep shaping later reasoning even when people remember that it was corrected. [Skeptical Science]skepticalscience.comSkeptical ScienceMisinformation and its Correction: Continued Influence and…May 5, 2012 — by S Lewandowsky · Cited by 4718 — Multiple…
The useful question, then, is not only “what fact is wrong?” but “what model made that fact feel right?” A myth becomes durable when it offers a causal story, fits prior assumptions, and gives people a practical way to interpret uncertainty. Repairing it means replacing the faulty model with a better one, not merely attacking a single claim.
Models rather than isolated facts
A mental model is a simplified internal representation of how something works. People use these models constantly: how infection spreads, why prices rise, what teachers reward, how the body heals, why a politician acted, or what a scientific warning means. Most are rough and practical rather than formal. They help people answer questions quickly: “What caused this?”, “Who benefits?”, “What should I do?”, “What should I be suspicious of?”
This matters because many myths are not random errors. They are answers produced by a larger pattern of reasoning. A person who believes a health myth, for example, may not just hold a false claim about one treatment. They may also rely on a broader model in which “natural” means safe, complicated medical language signals concealment, and personal testimony counts as stronger evidence than population-level data. Within that model, new anecdotes slide neatly into place while statistical evidence feels cold, distant or evasive.
Research on science learning shows the same pattern. Michelene Chi’s work on conceptual change distinguishes between simple false beliefs and deeper flawed mental models, where the learner’s responses are internally patterned rather than merely scattered mistakes. A flawed model can be “coherent” because it is retrieved and used consistently to answer questions and make predictions, even when it conflicts with the expert model. [education.asu.edu]education.asu.eduThree Types of Conceptual Change: Belief Revision, MentalThree Types of Conceptual Change: Belief Revision, Mental
A classic example comes from children’s ideas about the Earth. In a study by Stella Vosniadou and William Brewer, children did not merely alternate between “flat” and “round” at random. Many formed intermediate models such as a disc Earth, a dual Earth, a hollow sphere, or a flattened sphere. These models helped them reconcile what they had been told — that the Earth is round — with everyday assumptions such as “the ground beneath us is flat” and “people need support underneath them”. [ScienceDirect]sciencedirect.comSource details in endnotes.
That example is powerful because the children’s ideas are wrong, but not foolish. They are attempts to preserve coherence while absorbing new information. Adults do something similar with public myths: they graft new facts onto old assumptions, sometimes producing hybrid explanations that feel more stable than either the myth or the correction alone.
Why a wrong model can feel better than a missing one
A bare correction can create an explanatory hole. If someone hears that a warehouse fire was caused by carelessly stored flammable materials, that detail can become part of their causal model of the event. If the claim is later retracted, the model loses a key link: why did the fire spread so quickly? who was responsible? what made the event make sense? Reviews of the continued influence effect argue that people often continue to rely on discredited information because it filled a causal role in their understanding of the event. [Skeptical Science]skepticalscience.comSkeptical ScienceMisinformation and its Correction: Continued Influence and…May 5, 2012 — by S Lewandowsky · Cited by 4718 — Multiple…
This does not mean people are always stubborn or irrational. Sometimes the old explanation remains mentally available because the correction has not supplied a satisfying replacement. “That was not the cause” is weaker than “that was not the cause; here is what happened instead”. The Debunking Handbook 2020 makes this a central recommendation: effective debunking should lead with the fact, identify the myth only as needed, explain how it misleads, and provide an alternative causal explanation that fits the story. [Center for Climate Change Communication]climatechangecommunication.orgCenter for Climate Change Communication Debunking HandbookCenter for Climate Change Communication Debunking Handbook
The same mechanism helps explain why speculative myths thrive after disasters, crimes, disappearances or confusing public events. When reliable evidence is incomplete, people dislike being left with a blank space. A poor explanation can feel preferable to no explanation because it offers closure, assigns agency and turns uncertainty into a story. Narrative research on scientific misinformation makes a related point: stories can mislead, but they also provide meaning and causal structure, which is why corrective communication often needs to build a better story rather than merely remove a bad one. [PNAS]pnas.orgSource details in endnotes.
This is why myth correction often fails when it treats belief as a list of detachable statements. The myth may be serving several model-level functions at once:
- Causal closure: it explains why something happened.
- Moral order: it identifies blame, intention or negligence.
- Predictability: it suggests what will happen next.
- Practical guidance: it tells people what to avoid, buy, share or distrust.
- Identity fit: it agrees with what “people like us” already believe.
A correction that only addresses the first function may leave the others untouched. The false claim is weakened, but the old model remains available.
How coherence survives contradiction
A myth can absorb contradictory evidence if the wider model has ways to explain that evidence away. This is one reason myths can feel stable even when they are patched together from weak facts. A person may reject official data because their model says institutions hide inconvenient truths. They may dismiss expert consensus because their model says consensus is produced by groupthink or financial pressure. They may treat failed predictions as proof that opponents interfered. The contradiction does not always break the model; sometimes it becomes evidence inside the model.
Psychological reviews of misinformation identify several barriers to updating beliefs after correction, including familiarity, source credibility, identity, emotional investment and the continued influence of earlier information. These factors interact with mental models: repetition makes a model easier to retrieve, trusted sources make it safer to use, and identity can make abandoning it feel like betraying a group rather than revising a claim. [Nature]nature.comSource details in endnotes.
There is also an important education debate here. Some researchers argue that misconceptions often behave like coherent alternative theories; others, such as Andrea diSessa and colleagues in the “knowledge in pieces” tradition, argue that learners’ ideas may be more fragmented, context-sensitive and productive than the word “misconception” implies. The debate matters because it changes the teaching response: should educators replace a faulty model, reorganise useful fragments, or help learners notice when different intuitions conflict? [Springer]link.springer.comSpringerExploring factors that mitigate the continued influence of…by IP Kan · 2021 · Cited by 27 — The term “continued influence effe…
For myths and misconceptions in public life, the safest conclusion is not that every false belief is a perfectly coherent worldview. Many are messy. But even messy beliefs can gain local coherence when they answer the questions people care about. A myth does not need to explain everything; it only needs to explain enough, in a memorable way, to keep being used.
Why pressure brings old ideas back
Misconceptions often return under pressure because old models are familiar, fast and emotionally available. A person may learn the correct explanation in calm conditions but fall back on the older one when tired, threatened, embarrassed, rushed or surrounded by people who still use it. This is common in education: students can reproduce the right answer on a test yet revert to intuitive reasoning when solving a new problem. It is also common in public misinformation: people may accept a correction in the moment but later reason from the original story when discussing blame, risk or policy.
Research on the continued influence effect shows that corrections reduce misinformation’s impact but often do not eliminate it completely. A 2021 review notes that decades of work have identified factors that mitigate the effect, yet full elimination is rare. [Springer]link.springer.comModeling Types of Knowledge and Their Roles in LearningModeling Types of Knowledge and Their Roles in Learning A meta-analysis of science-relevant misinformation similarly reports that corrections can work, especially when they are detailed and explanatory, but that their effect depends on how the correction changes the audience’s prior model. [PMC]pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.govPMCMisconceptions Yesterday, Today, and TomorrowPMCMisconceptions Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Pressure matters because it changes which model is easiest to use. The old myth may be simpler, more vivid or more socially reinforced. It may also have emotional advantages: it can reduce anxiety by naming an enemy, provide pride by making the believer feel unusually perceptive, or offer control by turning complex systems into simple rules.
A common classroom version is the student who can recite that heavier and lighter objects fall at the same rate in a vacuum, yet still expects a heavier object to “naturally” fall faster in an everyday reasoning task. The older intuitive model — more weight means more downward force, therefore faster falling — feels grounded in lived experience. The scientific model requires a more carefully repaired understanding of force, resistance and acceleration. Under time pressure, the intuitive model wins.
The same pattern appears in health and risk myths. People may know in general that correlation is not causation, but in a frightening moment a vivid personal story can reactivate a simpler model: “this happened after that, so that caused this”. The model is wrong, but it is quick, human and emotionally legible.
Teaching through model repair
The most effective response to coherent myths is model repair. This means identifying the structure that makes the misconception work, then helping the learner build a better structure that performs the same useful tasks more accurately. It is not enough to say “wrong”; the replacement must explain more, predict better and feel usable.
In practice, model repair usually has three parts. First, make the current model visible. Ask what the person thinks is causing what, which evidence would matter, and what would count as a better explanation. Second, locate the load-bearing assumption. In the Earth example, the problem is not merely the word “round”; it is the assumption that people must stand on flat ground with support beneath them. Third, introduce the better model in a way that directly handles the old model’s strongest appeal. [ScienceDirect]sciencedirect.comSource details in endnotes.
This is why good correction often uses a fact–myth–fallacy–fact structure. Lead with the accurate claim, briefly name the myth so the reader knows what is being corrected, explain the mistaken reasoning, and return to the accurate model. The point is not to repeat the myth for drama, but to show the mechanism by which it misleads. [Center for Climate Change Communication]climatechangecommunication.orgCenter for Climate Change Communication Debunking HandbookCenter for Climate Change Communication Debunking Handbook
For teachers, journalists, clinicians and public communicators, several model-repair principles follow:
- Replace the explanation, not only the sentence. A correction should answer the causal question the myth had been answering.
- Preserve what was reasonable. Many misconceptions start from sensible observations: the ground looks flat; personal experience feels vivid; institutions can make mistakes. Better explanations should show where those observations fit.
- Name the trap. Explain whether the myth relies on a misleading analogy, a false cause, a missing denominator, a category error, cherry-picked evidence or an overgeneralised anecdote.
- Make the new model usable. Give readers a rule they can apply next time, such as “a single dramatic story can raise a question, but it cannot estimate risk”.
- Expect relapse. If the old model is socially repeated or emotionally satisfying, one correction is unlikely to be enough.
The Annenberg Public Policy Center has recently tested “mental model” approaches for mRNA vaccine misconceptions, using visual, verbal and animated models to teach underlying scientific concepts rather than only rebutting individual claims. The significance is the same: when a misconception is generated by a faulty picture of how a system works, communication has to repair that picture. [asc.upenn.edu]asc.upenn.eduSource details in endnotes.
What changes when we treat myths as coherent models
Treating myths as coherent models changes the tone of correction. It discourages mockery, because the question becomes “what made this idea fit?” rather than “how could anyone believe that?” It also makes correction more demanding. A fact-check can show that a claim is false; model repair must show what a better explanation looks like and why it should replace the old one.
This approach is especially useful for myths that survive across many individual claims. Someone can stop believing one rumour about vaccines, climate change, crime, nutrition or education while still retaining the model that produced the rumour. New myths then become easy to accept because they fit the same structure. Public-health reviews have found that strategies such as communicating scientific consensus, warning about misinformation, acknowledging uncertainty and avoiding scare tactics can matter because they shape how people interpret the whole risk model, not just one claim. [NIHR Evidence]evidence.nihr.ac.ukNIHR Evidence How to tackle vaccine misinformation: what works?NIHR Evidence How to tackle vaccine misinformation: what works?
The goal is not to pretend all myths are equally sophisticated. Some are lazy, opportunistic or deliberately manipulative. But even manipulative myths spread more easily when they plug into models people already have: distrust of elites, belief in hidden causes, preference for natural explanations, suspicion of complexity, or the feeling that official accounts leave something out.
A corrected model does three things better than the myth. It explains the same facts without needing special pleading. It remains stable when new evidence appears. And it gives the learner a practical way to reason under uncertainty. That is why “mental models that make myths coherent” is a central mechanism in understanding misconceptions: myths persist not only because people repeat them, but because they can make the world feel organised.
Amazon book picks
Further Reading
Books and field guides related to Why Wrong Ideas Can Feel Coherent. Use these as the next step if you want deeper reading beyond the article.
The Scout Mindset
Contrasts defensive belief protection with truth-seeking mental models.
Thinking, Fast and Slow
Explains cognitive shortcuts, coherence and confidence in mistaken judgments.
Made to Stick
Explains why simple, causal, concrete stories become memorable and persuasive even when wrong.
The knowledge illusion
Explains why coherent-feeling explanations can persist despite shallow or faulty knowledge.
Endnotes
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Source: link.springer.com
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s41235-021-00335-9Source snippet
SpringerExploring factors that mitigate the continued influence of...by IP Kan · 2021 · Cited by 27 — The term “continued influence effe...
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Source: education.asu.edu
Title: Three Types of Conceptual Change: Belief Revision, Mental
Link: https://education.asu.edu/sites/g/files/litvpz656/files/lcl/chi_concpetualchangechapter_0.pdf -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/001002859290018W -
Source: pnas.org
Link: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.1914085117 -
Source: nature.com
Link: https://www.nature.com/articles/s44159-021-00006-y -
Source: link.springer.com
Title: Modeling Types of Knowledge and Their Roles in Learning
Link: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-72170-5_5 -
Source: pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
Title: PMCMisconceptions Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow
Link: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4041497/ -
Source: asc.upenn.edu
Link: https://www.asc.upenn.edu/news-events/news/mental-model-approach-shows-promise-reducing-susceptibility-misconceptions-about-mrna-vaccination -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0959475211000454 -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0885201403000182 -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1364661321000516 -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0010027720302729 -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0022096508001513 -
Source: sciencedirect.com
Link: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/001002859290018W -
Source: link.springer.com
Link: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10389-022-01694-3 -
Source: link.springer.com
Link: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/0-306-47637-1_3 -
Source: researchnow.flinders.edu.au
Title: mental models of the earth a study of conceptual change in childh
Link: https://researchnow.flinders.edu.au/en/publications/mental-models-of-the-earth-a-study-of-conceptual-change-in-childh/ -
Source: iris.who.int
Link: https://iris.who.int/items/603e41a4-75d5-4d6b-bfeb-5ba29e2dc6ca -
Source: skepticalscience.com
Link: https://skepticalscience.com/docs/Lewandowsky_2012_misinfo.pdfSource snippet
Skeptical ScienceMisinformation and its Correction: Continued Influence and...May 5, 2012 — by S Lewandowsky · Cited by 4718 — Multiple...
Published: May 5, 2012
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Source: climatechangecommunication.org
Title: Center for Climate Change Communication Debunking Handbook
Link: https://www.climatechangecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/DebunkingHandbook2020.pdf -
Source: evidence.nihr.ac.uk
Title: NIHR Evidence How to tackle vaccine misinformation: what works?
Link: https://evidence.nihr.ac.uk/alert/how-to-tackle-vaccine-misinformation-what-works-and-what-doesnt/ -
Source: jstor.org
Link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1466679 -
Source: digitalcommons.unl.edu
Link: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/context/scholcom/article/1247/viewcontent/DebunkingHandbook2020.pdf -
Source: skepticalscience.com
Title: Debunking Handbook Part 5 Filling gap with alternative explanation
Link: https://skepticalscience.com/Debunking-Handbook-Part-5-Filling-gap-with-alternative-explanation.html -
Source: ltrr.arizona.edu
Title: Debunking Handbook
Link: https://www.ltrr.arizona.edu/~katie/kt/natsgc/Debunking_Handbook.pdf -
Source: frontiersin.org
Link: https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/social-psychology/articles/10.3389/frsps.2025.1621794/full
Additional References
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Source: youtube.com
Title: How to overcome confirmation bias and update your mental models
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The Psychology of Why Misinformation Persists...
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Title: Changing Your Mental Models (Systems Thinking)
Link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqS216_5_g4Source snippet
How to overcome confirmation bias and update your mental models...
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Source: researchgate.net
Link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258180567_Misinformation_and_Its_Correction_Continued_Influence_and_Successful_Debiasing -
Source: unicef.org
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Source: researchgate.net
Link: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278716843_Reframing_the_Classical_Approach_to_Conceptual_Change_Preconceptions_Misconceptions_and_Synthetic_Models
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